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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
questions of equality before the law, property 
rights and de-regulation.1 
People are ripped off, day in, day out, by the easy availability of limited liability 
for off-the-shelf companies and the protections provided for them, and with no 
real remedies. 
Andrew Phillips,  
legal advisor on the BBC Jimmy Young Show 
 
This paper reviews the present debate on corporate social responsibility and suggests 
measures to advance the interests of those concerned to ensure that corporations are 
responsible. The power of big businesses can be balanced and controlled by removing the 
special-interest protection that enables the shareholders who own corporations to avoid legal 
responsibility for the consequences of their actions. This protection is called limited liability. 
It argues limited liability is as Adam Smith put it an ‘unreasonable’ special interest 
priviledge that distorts the free market and is ripe for de-regulation. Further, limited liability 
breaches two fundamental principles of a free society, that all are inviolably equal before the 
law and that property rights should not be enfringed. 
 
Corporate power 
There is widespread public concern over the power of corporations. The needs of business 
have come to define politics today. The Anglo-American ‘Third Way’ and Britain’s New Labour 
have been attempts to fit public demands for a fair and just society with the needs of 
business. At a global level the strength and diversity of resistance to a political agenda driven 
by the needs of major corporations has been made evident by protests at the world trade 
talks in Seattle and Cancun. Meanwhile, Enron, WorldCom and similar scandals have 
produced a feeling in the general public, and even amongst shareholders, that they are being 
ripped off. 
Attempts to make businesses behave by campaigns for good corporate governance have 
had little effect. Corporations usually follow the legal advice that it is unlawful to pursue any 
other goal than delivering profit to shareholders. Other social or environmental objectives can 
                                                     
1 This paper develops chapter four of the author’s The Beauty Queen’s Guide to World 
Peace, (Politico’s, London, 2004). 
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be pursued, but they must contribute to this primary directive. The political energy poured into 
corporate governance can achieve little because of this legal imperative.  
A new strategy is needed to help corporations reinforce rather than undermine the fabric of 
society. The reforms I suggest would hold owners accountable in law. A close examination of 
the core of the common structure of corporations reveals fundamental breaches of the 
principles of a free, liberal democratic society. Focusing on the reform of limited liability can 
provide the basis within capitalist-liberal democracy for a radical redistribution of wealth and 
power based on the fundamental principles of equality before the law and the right to 
property. 
The key idea in the modern corporation is the concept of limited liability. This concept 
provides the owners, the shareholders, with complete power, but with no responsibility 
for the consequences of their actions. Their liability is limited to the sum of money they 
invest. This power without responsibility is driving the whole structure of global 
civilisation and yet it violates fundamental principles of justice and human rights in a free 
society. Limited liability creates inequality before the law by allowing the most powerful 
to be above the law, when in a free society all should be equal before the law. 
Attempts to find voluntary means of controlling corporate power have not had sufficient 
impact. There now needs to be a debate about the need for legal reforms to make 
shareholders and directors accountable for the actions of the companies they own. A 
movement for this reform should be the economic centrepiece of a global strategy for stability 
and prosperity. Such reform is necessary because existing attempts to obtain voluntary 
agreements from corporations to behave well are not working. Many people are unaware of 
the injustice created by limited liability, and consequently it is necessary to make the 
argument plainly and strongly. This does not mean that I believe that there are millions of 
people out there going to work every day saying to themselves, ‘I’m off to operate an unjust 
system.’ The dominance of limited liability has crept up on us over the years; people are 
rarely if at all deliberately operating a system that they are aware is unjust and violating the 
human rights of their fellow citizens. 
The existing debate on corporate power 
Corporate power has grown considerably since the collapse of communism and the 
widespread discrediting of state socialist approaches to running society. Will Hutton has 
argued with great clarity that the world as a whole has to face the damaging 
consequences of the triumph of Anglo-American business practice.2 Agreements in the 
World Trade Organisation and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) have extended and entrenched an agenda that favours 
international corporations in the name of free trade and free markets. 
                                                     
2 Hutton, W, The World We’re In (Abacus, London, 2003). 
Accountancy Business and the Public Interest, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2005 
 
4
Hutton’s argument is echoed by many of those supporting the Anglo-American model. Two 
leading US academic economists, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, provide a typical 
example of this analysis in their paper ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’.3 They argue: 
Despite the apparent divergence in institutions of governance, share ownership, 
capital markets, and business culture across developed economies, the basic 
law of the corporate form has already achieved a high degree of uniformity, and 
continued convergence is likely. A principal reason for convergence is a 
widespread normative consensus that corporate managers should act 
exclusively in the economic interests of shareholders, including noncontrolling 
shareholders. This consensus on a shareholder-oriented model of the 
corporation results in part from the failure of alternative models of the 
corporation, including the manager-oriented model that evolved in the US in the 
1950’s and 60’s, the labor-oriented model that reached its apogee in German co-
determination, and the state-oriented model that until recently was dominant in 
France and much of Asia. Other reasons for the new consensus include the 
competitive success of contemporary British and American firms, the growing 
influence worldwide of the academic disciplines of economics and finance, the 
diffusion of share ownership in developed countries, and the emergence of 
active shareholder representatives and interest groups in major jurisdictions. 
Since the dominant corporate ideology of shareholder primacy is unlikely to be 
undone, its success represents the end of history for corporate law. The ideology 
of shareholder primacy is likely to press all major jurisdictions toward similar 
rules of corporate law and practice. 
 
The notion of organising the world around the needs of shareholders has been 
questioned across the political spectrum, from the World Social Forum at Porto Alegre to 
the billionaire George Soros.4 Noam Chomsky,5 Naomi Klein and George Monbiot are 
authors whose work provides insights into the problems of corporate power and who 
begin to suggest alternatives. 
I do not wish to take time here to go over the familiar arguments about the problems 
presented by uncontrolled corporations beholden to their shareholders. But to summarise: 
corporations are accused of ignoring the interests of communities; of polluting the air, land 
and water; and of forcing nations and communities to give up nationalised and community-
based businesses and services. These problems are compounded by a tendency for national 
                                                     
3 Hansmann, H. and Kraakman, R, The End of History for Corporate Law, Working Paper 
#CLB-99-013 (New York University Center for Law and Business, New York, January 2000). 
4 Soros, G, George Soros on Globalization (PublicAffairs, Oxford, 2002). 
5 Herman, E. and Chomsky, N, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass 
Media, rev. ed. (Pantheon, New York, 2002). 
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and global markets to become dominated by a handful of huge corporations. Their resources 
are often larger than those of the countries in which they operate and they are able to use 
structures of linked corporations in many countries to avoid being held to account by the 
governments of the countries in which they operate. 
Think about cars, oil, accounting or pharmaceuticals, for example. In each of these 
industries only a handful of companies control the market. The problems caused by these 
corporations have come to dominate the proceedings of elite international gatherings such as 
the World Economic Forum at Davos. 
The opponents of corporate power suggest two main types of strategy for opposing it: local 
initiatives and corporate governance. Supporters of local initiatives, for example Colin Hines 
in Localization: A Global Manifesto,6 propose strengthening networks of local non-corporate 
economies and cultures, such as cooperatives and schemes to promote local produce. These 
networks include resistance to the idea of third-world farmers being driven into producing 
cash crops at the expense of existing, more integrated and sustainable economies. An 
example in the developed world is the network of Italian cities supporting local produce and 
using local-authority regulations to keep out global chains on the basis that they lack local 
content. These initiatives appear to work well, but they are by definition small scale, working 
at the edges of the economy. They can provide a safe place to hide from the trampling feet of 
the megacorps, but they are neither an effective defence nor an effective means of control. 
They are, however, a potential base from which such efforts at control can be built. 
In parallel with the growth of localism, there has also been a movement to reach voluntary 
agreements with corporations to persuade them to act with more consideration towards the people 
and the environment that they affect. Often termed ‘corporate governance’, this strategy aims to 
persuade business to become more socially and environmentally responsible. According to John 
Wolfensohn, then President of the World Bank, ‘Corporate governance is about promoting 
corporate fairness, transparency and accountability.’7 
The rebranding of British Petroleum as ‘Beyond Petroleum’ is an example of the effects of 
campaigns for corporate responsibility. The company has, at least in its advertising, engaged 
in social and environmental issues. Corporate governance has led to a less confrontational 
and more constructive relationship between pressure groups such as Oxfam or Greenpeace 
and the business community, but it has not led to much change. 
 
Christian Aid’s case studies of corporate social  
responsibility make a powerful case 
 
                                                     
6 Hines, C, Localization: A Global Manifesto (Earthscan, London, 2000). 
7 Financial Times, 21 June 1999. 
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‘The image of companies working hard to make the world a better place is too often just 
that – a carefully manufactured image,’ – says ‘Behind the Mask: The Real Face of 
Corporate Social Responsibility’, a new report from Christian Aid. Its target is the 
burgeoning industry known as corporate social responsibility – or CSR – which is now 
seen as a vital tool in promoting and improving the public image of some of the world’s 
largest companies and corporations. 
But, as the case studies in this report – featuring Shell, British American Tobacco and 
Coca-Cola – demonstrate, the rhetoric can also mask corporate activity that makes things 
worse for the communities in which they work. 
‘Some of those shouting the loudest about their corporate virtues are also among those 
inflicting continuing damage on communities where they work – particularly poor 
communities,’ says Andrew Pendleton, senior policy officer at Christian Aid and author of 
the report. ‘Legally binding regulation is now needed to lessen the devastating impact 
that companies can have in an ever-more globalised world.’ 
Christian Aid, January 2004 
 
Stock market scandals at the end of the twentieth century revived a different type of 
call for reform. This time it was not from those who had bad experiences from the 
direct operations of corporations, but from shareholders who lost money when the 
businesses failed. Corporate misdeeds have produced periodic reforms back into the 
nineteenth century. These reactions were at times especially strong in the US. At the 
time of Presidents Taft and Theodore Roosevelt in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, regulations against monopolies and price-fixing were introduced 
and monopolies such as that in the oil industry were broken up. The notorious stock 
market crash of 1929 produced some useful regulation of stock market activity and, 
under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, a host of union-friendly legislation.  
The latest scandals had two notable characteristics. Accountants had themselves cooked 
the books on a massive scale as their role morphed from being independent auditors to 
becoming integrated into company operations as ‘consultants’. Secondly, on the stock 
market, the corruption of independent financial advisers into sales staff for particular 
companies’ shares destroyed their hard-won reputation for impartiality. 
The effort at reform after the excesses of the 1990s has been weak and is already failing. The 
Financial Times reported in August 2003 that William Donaldson, the new chairman of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, had ‘voiced worries that entrepreneurial zeal was being 
stifled by regulations and new legal advice’. And Alan Greenspan, the guru chairing the US Central 
Bank, said that ‘such concerns might be one reason why corporate investment was being held 
back’.8 
In Britain, the chairman of Unilever, Niall FitzGerald, has elegantly described how demands 
for stronger corporate governance have been deflected: 
                                                     
8 Michaels, A, Financial Times, 27 August 2003. 
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On corporate governance, the trade and industry department should be 
congratulated for having resisted knee-jerk legislation or regulation in the wake 
of the Enron and WorldCom scandals. Initially it appeared too quick to accept 
recommendations in the Higgs report on corporate governance, but effective and 
extensive consultation has led to an outcome acceptable to all parties. In future 
such consultation will help head off a growing sense that Britain is no longer as 
friendly a place for business.9 
 
Fitzgerald’s final remark is interesting for its implied threat that business might move 
elsewhere, not because Britain may become unfriendly to business, but because it may 
just not remain friendly enough. That this hostility to better governance comes not from 
some speculator, but from a company which sells soap powder, indicates that the 
problem of improving corporate behaviour is deep-rooted. 
As Andrew Phillips, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, explains, once a private company becomes a 
limited-liability company, any thought that wider interests may be served is apt to be set aside 
and even government studies on governance pay little attention to broader issues: 
As the chairman of a large family business [Cadbury] put it when they finally 
went public, ‘once we became a quoted company, we were answerable to our 
shareholders in the same way as any other company and subject to the same 
external disciplines. We are, therefore, not in a position to make any special 
claims about the way in which the business is run and the values which lie 
behind its management, nor would it be right for us to do so.’ How sad, and how 
diminishing for our society. 
The fact of the matter is that the only stakeholders of the modern limited 
company recognised by law, beyond a sidelong glance at employees, are 
the shareholders. Indeed, the government report last month [January 2003] 
by a business luminary, Derek Higgs, on the role of non-executive directors, 
reinforces that narrow focus. In over one hundred pages there is scarcely a 
nod in the direction of the wider public interest, or of corporate citizenship. 
He repeatedly asserts that the required attributes of such directors are those 
of ‘skills, knowledge and experience’ without reference to their character, 
judgement or wisdom. This reflects the reality, namely that most such 
businesses operate within exceedingly introspective, two-dimensional 
parameters.10 
 
One of Higgs’s key recommendations was to improve corporate governance to widen the 
                                                     
9 FitzGerald, N, Financial Times, 8 September 2003. 
10  ‘The Charity/Business Duet: Harmony or Discord?’, Allen Lane Lecture, London, 11 
February 2003. 
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role of non-executive directors. These are people who sit on boards but are not involved 
in the day-to-day running of the business. Their purpose is mainly to protect the rights of 
investors from managers and directors seeking to feather their own nests. 
One form of developing corporate responsibility is the idea of stakeholding, which has been 
made popular by Will Hutton. His approach focuses on the question of the distortions caused by the 
requirement to maximise profits for shareholders. He attempts to redress this distortion by 
suggesting a change to company law that would require companies also to take into account a 
broader range of people with an interest in the company’s activities. Such people with an interest, 
or stake, in the company are termed ’. Key stakeholders, such as insurance companies, pension 
funds and other large institutional investors, could be made to control companies. Tony Blair had a 
brief flirtation with stakeholding shortly before coming to power in 1997. However, the negative 
reaction from business led to his dropping the idea. 
Stakeholding is an attractive idea because it offers the prospect of involving a broader 
range of people in a company’s activities. But this also creates significant problems of 
defining who does and does not have a stake in the company, and precisely what companies 
would have to do to meet these somewhat ill-defined demands. Hutton recommends that 
stakeholding be introduced by revisions to company law. This would be welcome, but as he 
recognises, it has so far failed to gather enough support. More fundamentally, although it 
adds some rights to people who are not shareholders, the stakeholding concept does not 
emphasise restoring natural responsibilities on owners for the consequences of their actions. 
A number of economists and business leaders have always rejected the idea that business 
should have a conscience and so far this view prevails. Milton Friedman consistently argued 
that anything that reduces the priority of delivering financial returns to shareholders is 
wrong.11 This view predominates today, as is indicated by the definition of corporate 
governance given by the OECD. The OECD is a club of the world’s richest nations. Its view of 
corporate governance is quite different from Wolfensohn’s. According to the OECD, 
Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed 
and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of 
rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as 
the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the 
rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it 
also provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and 
the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance.12 
 
There is nothing here about fairness, transparency and accountability. This definition is 
concerned with the rights and responsibilities of corporate decision-making. 
                                                     
11 Friedman, M, Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962). 
12 Corporate Governance 1999 (OECD, Paris, 1999). 
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The application of this narrow definition of corporate responsibility is intended to ensure 
that business plays by the rules and minimises corruption. An example of this approach is a 
speech to key Chinese business leaders by Britain’s top financial regulator, Howard Davies. 
His topic was ‘Corporate Governance and the Development of Global Capital Markets’.13 That 
is to say, he was discussing the ways in which corporate governance matters to the 
development of global capitalism. His key point is that corruption in business makes doing 
business more expensive and so less attractive to investors coming from outside a particular 
culture: 
Another, harder piece of evidence comes from some American research on the 
cost of capital. US academic researchers have found that in countries where the 
policing of insider trading is regarded as weak, or where the legal framework is 
poor, the cost of capital for firms is typically some 3 percentage points higher 
than in countries where insider dealing is policed effectively. 
So good corporate governance, and effective regulation, contribute both to the 
attractiveness of a country in terms of inward investment and business 
development, and also to the efficiency of its capital markets, and their 
effectiveness in the service of the real economy. It is always as well to remember 
these points when considering what can sometimes be a rather dry topic. And it 
is important to make these arguments robustly to those who argue that efforts 
devoted to upgrading corporate governance are costly and bureaucratic, and add 
little value to the economy. In my view, investment in good corporate governance 
arrangements, and good regulation of those arrangements, is among the most 
effective and rewarding investments a developing market can make, and there 
are figures to prove it. 
 
These are important objectives as far as they go but they ignore the broader question of 
the relationship of the corporation to society. 
The concept of corporate governance contains no financial or legal power to correct 
business behaviour beyond improving returns to shareholders. It is an ill-defined 
approach that absorbs enormous energy from NGOs, academics, unions, government 
departments and businesses. After more than a decade of political activity, attempts to 
control businesses through this approach have failed to produce results that even keep 
up with the problems. 
Another approach to controlling corporations has centred on the idea of increasing the 
power of shareholders. In large modern corporations, the directors and managers of the 
business have come to assume a very large degree of power. Shareholders often own too 
few shares, are too ill-informed, or are simply too uninterested to get a grip on company 
                                                     
13 Howard Davies, Chairman, UK Financial Services Authority, ‘Corporate Governance and 
the Development of Global Capital Markets’, China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
Beijing, 22 April 2002. 
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operations. The scandals of the 1990s produced new calls for accountability to shareholders 
as a means of preventing financial mismanagement. It is this type of concern that the Higgs 
report in Britain and new regulations from the US Securities and Exchange Commission were 
meant to address. But, unfortunately, it is these very same constraints that the leading 
business figures quoted earlier were so keen to cast aside. The push for shareholder 
accountability is thus proving as ineffective as the governance and stakeholding efforts to 
control corporations. 
Pressure groups have often used purchasing shares as a means of putting corporate 
behaviour in the spotlight. The idea is that as shareowners, protestors can gain access to the 
annual general meetings of corporations and then ask questions and make points during the 
meeting. A typical example comes from Greenpeace in New Zealand, where it was seeking to 
stop pollution: 
Greenpeace campaigns don’t always end up in inflatable boats or with activists 
locked on to smokestacks. We took the Auckland International Airport Ltd (AIAL) 
incineration campaign straight to the boardroom challenging AIAL to live up to its 
vision through a shareholder resolution at their AGM. 
Greenpeace purchased the minimum number of shares to allow it to take the 
resolution forward. Greenpeace board chair Gordon Duncan and campaigner 
Sue Connor presented the argument for a clean alternative to a packed AGM in 
Auckland. Residents of Mangere community, located downwind of the 
incinerator, also attended to convey their concerns. 
The resolution was not formally passed but there was a lot of support for its 
spirit. AIAL can be left in no doubt that this is an important issue for many 
individual and corporate shareholders. 
AIAL agreed to fulfil the demand of Manukau City Council, the third largest 
shareholder, that the company urgently investigate alternative ways of treating 
their waste. However, they have yet to make any real change. 
Greenpeace will continue to put pressure on AIAL to ensure that the 
investigation is robust and that the true social and environmental costs of 
incineration are taken in to account. Any thorough investigation will show the 
only viable option is to move to a cleaner alternative such as steam sterilisation. 
 
This type of activity can be used to forward the public interest, but it is rare that these 
activist shareholders have the money and numbers to win at the end of the day. 
Nevertheless, the tactic serves to highlight the privileged immunity that shareholders 
enjoy. Greenpeace had rights to debate with the company because it became a part-
owner in it. Had Greenpeace members just been citizens standing choking in the fumes, 
the company would have had no automatic duty to engage with them. 
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Limiting Limited Liability: a case for the de-regulation of a 
special interest protection, and the restoration of legal and 
property rights. 
Most businesses are organised as companies with a legal structure in which the owners  
or shareholders (I will use the two words as synonyms) hold limited liability. This means 
that if the company fails or causes damage, the shareholders only lose the sum of money 
they invested. The company is designed to provide them with money, while protecting 
them from the responsibility for their actions or inactions in relation to it. A company can 
be prosecuted or sued if it sells defective products, destroys the environment or sells 
weapons to the enemy, but its shareholders are immune. Shareholders have regulated 
protection, at a time when other regulation is being swept away in their favour. Company 
directors also escape personal liability, seemingly because they are agents of 
shareholders, who are not liable. Nowadays, directors seem to exist in a privileged 
twilight zone beyond the reach of shareholders and public alike. 
Owners’ power without responsibility is central to the problem of corporate globalisation. 
Owners are the greatest beneficiaries of government regulation, yet demand that only they 
enjoy the protection of such regulation. As corporate power has grown, owners together have 
exercised vast powers over the world economy without having to take responsibility for the 
consequences of their actions. Some of the worst examples of abuse in fact come from 
undemocratic societies, or societies with elites that have recently moved from communism to 
democracy. All too often these cliques have neatly grabbed a nation’s assets during 
privatisation and find that the protected existence of a new economic aristocracy provides 
them with an even more special status than they enjoyed so recently as members of the 
Communist Party elites. 
In the modern world the assumption that a neo-liberal form of capitalism is the only form of 
economic activity acceptable had created an economic monoculture. We appear to have 
entered an era of Totalitarian Capitalism in which owners are beyond the law to an extent not 
enjoyed by the Central Committees of the Communist Parties and whose only parallel in 
Europe is the aristocracy of the Ancien Regimes of the pre-enlightment. 
To restore the balance in society, shareholders’ limited liability must be deregulated so that 
they no longer hold a special status. The very phrase ‘free market’ is a nonsense because the 
special interests of shareholders are protected from free-market forces. 
The economist Adam Smith was one of the first to identify the problems of limited liability 
companies, or joint-stock companies, as they were originally called (and are so still in some 
parts of the world, such as Russia). Joint-stock companies had first been developed by the 
Dutch and were quickly taken up in London when the Dutchman William of Orange became 
King William III of England in 1689. The first stock market speculations and crashes came 
soon afterwards, the crashes following on from scams involving Dutch tulips and the famous 
‘South Sea Bubble’. This was not, as I fondly imagined as a child, some gigantic soap bubble 
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– perhaps blown by a whale – but an investment con selling the idea of luxury imports from 
newly discovered territories in the oceans of the Southern hemisphere. 
It was against this background that Smith considered limited-liability companies in The 
Wealth of Nation. In it he opposes the development of limited-liability companies, though he 
saw a limited value for them in the construction of some public works. 
Adam Smith denounces limited liability in  
The Wealth of Nations (emphasis added) 
 
“Joint stock companies, established either by royal charter or by act of parliament, differ 
in several respects, not only from regulated companies, but from private copartneries. 
First, in a private copartnery, no partner, without the consent of the company, can 
transfer his share to another person, or introduce a new member into the company. Each 
member, however, may, upon proper warning, withdraw from the copartnery, and 
demand payment from them of his share of the common stock. In a joint stock company, 
on the contrary, no member can demand payment of his share from the company; but 
each person can, without their consent, transfer his share to another person, and thereby 
introduce a new member. The value of a share in a joint stock is always the price which it 
will bring in the market; and this may be either greater or less, in any proportion, than the 
sum which its owner stands credited for in the stock of the company. 
Secondly, in a private copartnery, each partner is bound for the debts contracted by 
the company to the whole extent of his fortune. In a joint stock company, on the contrary, 
each partner is bound only to the extent of his share. 
The Trade of a joint stock company is always managed by a court of directors. The 
court, indeed, is frequently subject, in many respects, to the control of a general court of 
proprietors. But the greater part of those proprietors seldom pretend to understand 
anything of the business of the company; and when the spirit of faction happens not to 
prevail among them, give themselves no trouble about it, but receive contentedly such 
half yearly or yearly dividend, as the directors think proper to make to them. This total 
exemption from trouble and from risk, beyond a limited sum, encourages many people to 
become adventurers in joint stock companies, who would, upon no account, hazard their 
fortunes in any private copartnery ... The directors of such companies, however, being 
the managers rather of other people’s money than their own, it cannot well be expected 
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in 
a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, 
they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and 
very easily give themselves dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of 
such a company. 
 
*   *   * 
 
To establish a joint stock company, however, for any undertaking, merely because such a 
company might be capable of managing it successfully; or to exempt a particular set of 
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dealers from some of the general laws which take place with regard to all their 
neighbours, merely because they might be capable of thriving if they had such an 
exemption, would certainly not be reasonable. To render such an establishment 
perfectly reasonable ... it ought to appear with the clearest evidence that the undertaking 
is of greater and more general utility than the greater part of common trades. ... The joint 
stock companies, which are established for the public-spirited purpose of promoting 
some particular manufacture, over and above managing their own affairs ill, to the 
diminution of the general stock of the society, can in other respects scarce ever fail to do 
more harm than good. Notwithstanding the most upright intentions, the unavoidable 
partiality of their directors to particular branches of the manufacture, of which the 
undertakers mislead and impose upon them, is a real discouragement to the rest, and 
necessarily breaks, more or less, that natural proportion which would otherwise establish 
itself between judicious industry and profit, and which, to the general industry of the 
country, is of all encouragements the greatest and the most effectual.14 
 
So, the man held up as the ancestral guru of the business world opposed the legal 
structure of modern business. He also provided an analysis that accurately describes the 
concerns many feel about company mismanagement today. Company directors act as 
the ‘stewards’ of the rich absentee landlords – the shareholders. However, in the 
contemporary world the annual general meeting has minimal power. Perhaps it needs to 
be reinvigorated as the ‘general court of proprietors’ mentioned by Smith. 
Smith’s condemnation of limited liability is omitted from the way his views are handed down 
by free-market advocates. Britain’s Adam Smith Institute is a bastion of corporate rights. Fans 
of globalisation such as Philippe Legrain find it useful to cite Smith’s wisdom in support of 
their arguments, but omit his critique of the structure of modern capitalism. Even Arnold 
Schwarzenegger cited The Wealth of Nations as one of the most important books in his life, 
though he is scarcely an advocate of repealing limited liability. 
Smith’s concerns over limited liability are discussed by John Micklethwait and Adrian 
Wooldridge in their recent hymn to corporations, The Company: A Short History of a 
Revolutionary Idea.15 They state that Smith had two objections to limited liability: that such 
companies were inefficient and tended in his day to be monopolies. Whatever the merits of 
these objections, Micklethwait and Wooldridge fail to consider at all Smith’s main objection, 
namely that society should not exempt some people from general laws simply because they 
may thrive as a result. 
It may seem a startling idea to reform or remove limited liability. We look back at past ages 
and think, how could people have put up with an obvious injustice like feudal serfdom or the 
                                                     
14 Smith, A. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, [1776] 1976). An excerpt (Book V, ch. 1, pt iii, art. i, pp. 280-82). 
15 Micklethwait, J. and Wooldridge, A. The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea 
(Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 2003). 
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slave trade? Perhaps when you are born and brought up in such a system it seems natural 
and it would be dangerous to tamper with it. ‘Squire knows best,’ mutters the peasant in many 
a period drama. A similar fear exists around business: ‘It has always been like this and the 
economy will collapse if we challenge the basis of corporate organisation.’ 
Blindness to the issue of owner responsibility is illustrated in the recent Progressive 
Manifesto edited by Anthony Giddens, which offers new ideas for the centre-left. He argues 
that citizens need to take much greater responsibility, rather than relying so much on state 
provisions, but the key powerful class of owners is not even mentioned. The focus is on the 
mostly economically weak recipients of government money: they are the ones who have to 
change their ways. Nevertheless, there are some outright critics of limited liability, such as the 
Australian academic John Quiggen, who points out that many economists criticised the 
proposals for limited-liability laws in the nineteenth century. In the US, David Korten has 
written powerfully against the problem of limited liability.16  
Equality before the law and property rights 
Equality before the law is often cited as one of the fundamental rights of a free society. It is 
enshrined in Article 7 of the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which states: ‘All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal 
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation 
of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.’ Earlier in the seventeen 
hundreds in the American Declaration of Independence and in the French Revolution, 
‘Equality’ was a key assertion of political rights. But, as Smith pointed out so succinctly two 
hundred years ago, ‘to exempt a particular set of dealers from some of the general laws which 
take place with regard to all their neighbours, merely because they might be capable of 
thriving if they had such an exemption, would certainly not be reasonable.’ 
The property rights of the many are enfringed to the benefit of the minority through limited 
liability in violation of Articles 2 and 27 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights. It is not merely 
that limited liability gives those who enjoy it an advantage. Those whose property they injur 
have no redress against them. Anyone who has tried to gain redress from a company that has 
gone into liquidation will understand the point. 
Do these exemptions amount to inequality? Well, that is what exemption means. Some 
people may argue that the limited-liability laws have been created democratically. This is true 
but also irrelevant since they can also be repealed democratically. The debate should be 
about changing the law which provides for this inequality, and it is clear that those who cling 
to the way things are believe that this inequality is a good thing, helping make society as a 
whole better off, and that to threaten this inequality is merely destructive nihilism. 
                                                     
16 Korten, D, When Corporations Rule the World (Kumarian Press/Berrett-Koehler, West 
Hartford, CT and San Francisco, 1995). 
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It is also true that shareholding was entrenched in the Western democracies long before 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. So, again I can hear an argument coming: ‘Since 
shareholding existed before modern human-rights law, then surely it cannot be affected by it.’ 
This argument is similar to an infamous argument over the US Constitution. It is based on the 
assumption made in the Declaration of Independence: ‘We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.’ 
However, when it was written, few of the men who approved it would admit that black people 
were people at all. They were merely property. The point of relevance to the limited-liability 
debate is that it is possible to re-examine how definitions are applied as circumstances 
change. 
It is especially helpful to reopening the debate over limited liability that there is a history of 
clear criticism from leading public figures all the way back to the time when limited liability was 
first introduced. Today the social damage created by limited-liability companies has become 
the major focus of political concern about the global economy and is overdue for reform. 
In theory such reform should be a concern of American conservative and libertarian groups 
such as the Federalist Society, who aim to roll back laws that they construe as going beyond 
the statements of the Founding Fathers. Limited liability is the most damaging and glaring 
example of going beyond the intent of the Founding Fathers by creating a whole class of 
people exempt from the law. 
To summarise, limited liability can be seen as removing the human right of the vast majority 
of people on the planet to equality before the law, the core value of a free society. 
Limited liability protects corruption 
When I started considering the reform of company law I stumbled over a legal idea that 
seems to come from Lord of the Rings or Buffy the Vampire Slayer – ‘piercing the 
corporate veil’. 
In the imposing terminology of the legal profession, there is a ‘veil’ that protects 
shareholders from liability. Now, I am sure that legal historians will be able to find all sorts of 
explanations for the evolution of this term. The veil is worn by women to hide their sexuality or 
grief, customary in Muslim societies and made erotic in the dance of the seven veils; this is 
the legal concept upon which corporate globalisation rests, a veil through which shareholders 
can see but not be seen, a one-way mirror, a one-way street of power where they can act but 
not be acted upon. I would have thought that both Freudian psychoanalysis and feminist 
theory would have generated a few dozen PhD theses on the imagery invoked by this idea, 
but sadly I have not found any. 
The concept of ‘piercing the veil’ describes some barely known circumstances in which 
under certain states’ laws shareholders can be held liable for their actions. According to one 
British specialist discussing a case relating to claims for asbestos-related injuries that were 
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thwarted by layers of Russian-doll-like limited-liability companies with one hiding inside 
another: 
Any modern consideration of lifting the corporate veil must almost certainly 
begin with the decision of the Court of Appeal in Adams v Cape Industries 
[1991] 1 All ER 929. The case saw the most detailed judicial review of this 
aspect of company law ever undertaken in the UK. Justice Scott, and then 
the Court of Appeal, refused to allow the veil to be lifted on an English 
parent company whose American subsidiary had been successfully sued by 
American litigants but which had insufficient assets to satisfy judgement. 
Lord Justice Slade said: ‘Our law, for better or worse, recognises the 
creation of subsidiary companies, which though in one sense the creatures 
of their parent companies, will nevertheless under the general law fall to be 
treated as separate legal entities with all the rights and liabilities which 
would normally attach to separate legal entities.’ The law will not permit the 
lifting of the corporate veil just because the interests of justice would be 
better served by doing so.17 
 
This specialist went on to say that the veil of incorporation may be lifted where a 
company is a sham and no third party has an involvement with it. It may also be lifted 
where the company is a party to a fraud. It will not be lifted just because justice demands 
it. A director can escape personal liability to a third party in negligence by acting through 
his company and ensuring that he is perceived as accepting no personal liability for what 
he is doing. He cannot escape personal liability where he acts fraudulently on behalf of 
his company. A similar legal protection exists in the US.18 
Even in a key organ of corporate globalisation, the OECD, there is a recognition that this type of 
activity, especially when hidden behind the seven veils of subsidiary companies, does represent an 
obstacle to shareholders turning an honest profit. The 2001 OECD study ‘Behind the Corporate 
Veil: Using Corporate Entities for Illicit Purposes’ concludes: 
Corporate entities – corporations, trusts, foundations and partnerships – are 
often misused for money laundering, bribery and corruption, shielding assets 
from creditors, tax evasion, self-dealing, market fraud and other illicit activities. 
The veil of secrecy they provide in some jurisdictions may also facilitate the flow 
of funds to terrorist organisations. 
                                                     
17 Griffiths, M. ‘Lifting the Corporate Veil’, Kensington Business School, London, 2003. 
 
18 http://www.vssp.com/CM/Environmental%20Alerts/environmental%20alerts100.asp 
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‘Behind the Corporate Veil’ concludes that the types of corporate entities that are most 
frequently misused are those that provide the greatest degree of anonymity to their 
beneficial owners. In response, the OECD calls on governments and other relevant 
authorities to ensure they are able to obtain information on the beneficial ownership and 
control of corporate entities and, where appropriate, to share this information with law 
enforcement authorities domestically and internationally. Specifically, the OECD 
recommends that governments should consider taking action to: 
 
• Require up front disclosure of beneficial ownership and control information to the 
authorities upon the formation of the corporate vehicle; 
• Oblige intermediaries involved in the formation and management of corporate vehicles 
(such as company formation agents, trust companies, lawyers, trustees, and other 
professionals) to maintain such information; 
• Develop the appropriate law enforcement infrastructure to enable them to launch 
investigations into beneficial ownership and control when illicit activity is suspected. 
 
As should now be clear, it is now the company that gets sued; even though the company 
is not actually a person, just an idea, the law says that a company is treated as a person.  
In his book, The Corporation, the leading Canadian legal theorist Professor Joel Bakan 
argues that the modern business corporation is created by law to function like a psychopathic 
personality. However, although Balkan suggests that the artificial personality of the 
corporation be limited he does not develop a strategy of reform. 
 
A limited-liability company can simply be the expendable fall guy that can be declared 
bankrupt or shut down while the shareholders are long gone. Companies have additional 
structures to protect themselves even further. This is through the creation of subsidiary 
companies. In this case the subsidiary may be sued but its parent company cannot 
because it is the shareholder. In this way a further incentive to irresponsible behaviour 
has been created. 
The argument for owners’ privilege 
John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge uphold a tradition of enthusiastic supporters of 
limited liability. They assert that ‘the most important organisation in the world is the 
company: the basis of the prosperity of the West and the best hope of the rest of the 
world.’ This is the main idea used to defend the special-interest protection enjoyed by 
shareholders. It is at least odd to hear the argument that limited liability provides a unique 
public benefit from those who argue at the same time that there must be no public duty at 
all placed upon shareholders and companies. They seem to be saying, ‘Look, we are 
making the whole world work, don’t mess it up.’ In addition, there is the argument that 
there is no real privilege because anyone can buy shares or, as Marie Antoinette might 
have said, ‘anyone can buy cake.’ 
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Limited liability is credited with creating the vast increase in wealth since the Industrial 
Revolution. Any attempt to tamper with it will meet great resistance. Even calls for a minimum 
wage and for social security have been thought to have the potential to cause lasting damage 
to business. The first time I raised the issue of deregulating shareholder immunity, I came 
across the vehement objection of a group of venture capitalists. They argued that even raising 
the prospect of suing shareholders would damage investor confidence and was therefore a 
dangerous idea. It is certainly true that a market in stocks and shares has been an effective 
means of raising capital for businesses for more than two hundred years. Some people 
believe that raising money in this way is essential to the organisation of the economy. 
The Industrial Revolution was well under way before the limited liability became the norm.19 
The joint-stock company with tradable shares was not made generally available for business 
activities in England until 1844, and limited liability was not added to the form until 1855. 
While some American states developed the form for general use a few years earlier, all 
general business corporation statutes appear to date from well after 1800. By around 1900, 
however, every major commercial jurisdiction appears to have provided for at least one joint-
stock company. As the BBC’s History Timeline explains, 
this allowed companies to limit the liability of their individual investors to the 
value of their shares. Prior to this, investors in a company stood to lose all their 
wealth if economic circumstances forced the company they had invested in out 
of business. The curtailing of risk as a result of the act is credited with being the 
basis for the increased investment in trade and industry, although most of the 
evidence for this is apocryphal.20 
 
Until the 1930s in the US there were two major exceptions to limited liability. California 
not only had no limited-liability law, but it insisted that companies based in other parts of 
the US did not have limited liability in California. The US banking system did not operate 
under limited liability either. 
Different approaches to liability were used in these instances. In California there was a 
system called pro-rata liability.21 Pro-rata liability means that in addition to risking their 
investment, shareholders are responsible for the debts of the company in proportion to the 
amount of the company they own. Own one per cent of the shares and be responsible for one 
per cent of the debt. In the US banking sector it was common until the 1930s for shareholders 
to be responsible for the debts of the company to the extent of two or three times the face 
value of the shares that they owned. The face value is the value of the shares when they 
were sold to the public. For example, a company might offer 1,000,000 £1 shares for sale on 
                                                     
19 Hansmann and Kraakman, op. cit. passim. 
20 BBC History Timeline on the Limited Liability Act of 1855. 
21 Weinstein, M. Share Price Changes and the Arrival of Limited Liability in California 
(University of Southern California Law School, Los Angeles, 2002). 
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the stock market, they might then be traded at a value of 10p or £10, but the liability would be 
based on the issued share price of £1. 
There have been a few studies that attempt to provide evidence that unlimited liability can 
work as well as or better than limited. Lewis Evans and Neil Quigley studied the legal 
structure of shareholding in the banking industry of nineteenth-century Scotland.22 At this time 
some banks used the system of limited liability that we know so well today, while others used 
a system of unlimited liability. This was at a time when Scottish capital was playing a crucial 
role in the financial development of the British Empire. They found that in some special 
circumstances, unlimited liability might even be more effective. A study by Mark Weinstein of 
the introduction of limited liability in California found that it had no discernible effect on the 
stock market price of companies’ shares, although at that time Californians had not developed 
the art of suing corporations, still less their shareholders.23 This form of company law, which I 
will call ‘traditional Californian capitalism’, has much to offer the twenty-first century. 
In the modern age, perhaps the most famous and largest example of unlimited, rather than 
limited, liability is the practice in the London insurance market run by Lloyd’s. Lloyd’s of 
London has for many years been the major insurer of businesses in the world. Under this 
system people known as ‘names’ agree to put their entire wealth at risk to guarantee the 
insurance market. As a result of their willingness to accept an unlimited risk they receive high 
returns on their investments. For many years, the insurance industry was regarded as a 
source of great wealth for those already wealthy. Regardless of its recent problems where 
some insurers have gone bankrupt, Lloyd’s of London provides an example of a key part of 
the structure of international business that is not run on the basis of limited liability. The 
existence of such a key, world-leading industry, not reliant on a limited-liability structure, is of 
great importance. It provides a substantial example to counter those who argue that limited 
liability is the only way global markets can operate. 
Professions such as law, accountancy and architecture have all operated as 
successful businesses for many years without the protection of limited liability. However, 
starting in the US, a new concept of limited liability has been introduced to allow these 
professionals to escape liability for their actions. When new laws were proposed in 
Britain to extend limited liability to the professions, Phillips made a vain attempt to at 
least force companies to advertise any previous names they had used to conduct 
business. In debate, the government minister makes a crack at Phillips’s own profession 
of law: 
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: ‘But was it not Adam Smith who also said that all 
professions were a conspiracy against the laity?’ 
                                                     
22 Evans, L. and Quigley, N. ‘Shareholder Liability Regimes, Principal-Agent Relationships, 
and Banking Industry Performance’, Journal of Law and Economics, 1995, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 
497–520. 
23 Weinstein op. cit. 
Accountancy Business and the Public Interest, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2005 
 
20
 
Lord Phillips of Sudbury: ‘That is precisely why I have opposed this Bill stock, 
root and branch. I am a great admirer of my own profession. But I am afraid that 
this measure is apt to be  a conspiracy against the public interest from start to 
finish. However, I am more concerned with the small traders who will take 
advantage of the special privileges of this Bill. Let us make no bones about it; 
this will provide your two-man cowboy building outfit with a uniquely flexible and 
light framed means of screwing the public, to put it in Anglo-Saxon terms ... One 
of my jobs is that of legal adviser on the Jimmy Young Show. Over 25 years I 
have heard of hundreds of thousands of cases of abuse in relation to small, local 
companies that get nowhere near the attention of the DTI and get nowhere near 
being addressed by the various provisions to which the Minister refers. It 
depresses me that in this House we are so far out of touch with public opinion, if 
I may put it this way, at the bottom end of the social spectrum. People are ripped 
off, day in, day out, by the easy availability of limited liability for off-the-shelf 
companies and the protections provided for them, and with no real remedies.’24 
 
Supporters of the expansion of limited liability as the dominant form of social organisation 
downplay other economic models, including European social democracy and various 
forms of Japanese and south-east Asian economies that have all produced significant 
and sustained economic growth in the contemporary world. In much of the world and 
indeed in much of US history, shareholder privilege was balanced by other laws and 
powers in society. At present these balanced and socialised forms of business are under 
attack. This may be because they are less effective, or simply because they provide 
fewer benefits to those with power. 
Today corporations and their political allies are seeking to sweep all of these protections 
away. Rather than resist this by defending the more socially integrated forms of business, it 
will be more effective to attack the injustice fundamental to unfettered shareholder power. 
The idea that the economy can only function when property-owners are protected from 
having any responsibility for their actions is not historically accurate. It is easy to forget 
that an international economy had existed and prospered for thousands of years before 
the invention of limited liability. Business and trade are ancient practices that have been 
helped and hindered by the social practices of the times. In England for example, 
Cornish tin-miners were trading successfully as far away as the Mediterranean even 
before the Roman Empire. Trade and business are as old as civilisation. 
One of the reasons most often given on behalf of business and shareholders for the 
continuation of limited liability is that anyone can freely choose to go into business or 
invest through buying shares. Millions of people own shares through their pension 
                                                     
24  House of Lords, 24 January 2004. 
Accountancy Business and the Public Interest, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2005 
 
21
schemes or through investment companies that manage the money of many small 
investors. There is no doubt that this has benefited many millions of people, myself 
included; however, even in the US only one-half of all households participate in the stock 
market through pension plans, and of these households very few have more than a tiny 
proportion of the shares of any one company. It will be simple to if necessary, make a 
cut-off point for liability for small shareholders – just so long as that does not provide a 
loophole for large institutional investors. In any case, the major corporations, institutions 
and the super-rich are the groups that own significant parts of major companies. As has 
been demonstrated in the studies by Professor Edward N. Wolff of New York University 
in 1989, ten per cent of US families owned eighty-nine per cent of stocks and bonds 
traded on the stock exchange.25 Since then these concentrations have increased. Similar 
concentrations of wealth protected by limited-liability laws now exist around the world. 
US families are classified into wealth class by Wolff on the basis of their net worth. In the 
top one per cent of the wealth distribution (the ‘Super Rich’) are families with a net worth of 
$2.35 million or more in 1989; in the next nine per cent (the ‘Rich’) are families with a net 
worth greater than or equal to $346,400 but less than $2.35 million; in the bottom ninety per 
cent (‘Everybody Else’) are families with a net worth less than $346,400: 
 
 Stocks Bonds 
Super Rich 46.2% 54.2% 
Rich 43.1% 34.3% 
Everybody Else 10.7% 11.5% 
 
Supporters of mass shareholding often make exaggerated claims that a few years down 
the road result in great disappointment. In the 1980s Margaret Thatcher’s government 
had TV advertising campaigns trying to persuade members of the public to buy shares in 
the newly privatised utilities. A few years later large corporations were buying out these 
small shareholders – few had ever bought more shares and the cost of providing them 
with information was very uneconomic for the privatised companies. During the stock 
market boom of the 1990s conservative politicians in the US and Britain began to 
campaign to privatise social-security holdings. This would have meant that this money 
was no longer held by the government bank but could be invested in companies. This 
idea was becoming fashionable until there was a sudden dramatic fall in the stock 
market, after which little more was heard of the idea. 
                                                     
25 Wolff, E. ‘How the Pie Is Sliced: America’s Growing Concentration of Wealth’, American 
Prospect, 1995, vol. 6, no. 22. 
Accountancy Business and the Public Interest, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2005 
 
22
Strategies for restoring freedom 
As I have discussed, the idea of freeing the market from special-interest protections and 
distortions should have special appeal in the US. Conservative and libertarian lawyers 
and activists are keen to remove regulations of all kinds. In their key network the 
Federalist Society they argue for some particular views of what they see as the original 
US Constitution and oppose laws that seek to develop and change policy with time. From 
this perspective, limited liability is a classic example of a distortion of the clear 
constitutional principle of equality before the law. 
For Americans, restoring equal rights may be an especially important argument for creating 
a more equal society. This is because it destroys the myth that the rich are rich by dint of hard 
work or inheritance and that any tax to help the less well off is simply theft to assist the lazy. 
Exposing limited liability for what it is, explodes this delusion once and for all. 
Proponents of the free-market-especially neo-liberal advocates in Universities, the media, 
think tanks and politics should sought out and asked for their support in removing the obstacle 
to the free market that is limited liability. 
Lawyers and legally oriented pressure groups both conservative and progressive should be 
engaged very specifically on the contradiction between limited liability and the provisions of 
laws and principles of common law concerning the rights of the individual to both equality 
before the law and the enjoyment of their property without being injured by those against 
whom redress is impossible.  
From the left, Professor Harry Glasbeek has argued: ‘There is an entirely plausible 
argument to be made that criminal law should hold major shareholders responsible for the 
many evils done by the corporation on their behalf. And many social and environmental 
campaigners are now focusing their attentions on the laws that allow shareholders and 
investors the protection of their “invisible friend” – the legal fiction that is the corporation.’26 
‘Sue the shareholders’ may look good on a protest banner. But to be effective, a campaign 
to restore equal freedoms to the economic market needs to have some practical intermediate 
stages. In general terms a clear understanding of the special status enjoyed by shareholders 
should make it easier to argue for balancing rights for community groups, elected 
governments and trade unions. More specifically, there need to be some adjustments to the 
laws that govern corporations. Fortunately, there are useful historical examples. Two 
mentioned earlier should be considered. These are the ideas of having a liability two or three 
times the price of the share and of pro-rata liability. 
                                                     
26 Glasbeek, H, ‘The Invisible Friend’, New Internationalist, July 2003, no. 358. Prof. Glasbeek 
is Professor Emeritus and Senior Scholar, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
Toronto, and author of Wealth by Stealth: Corporate Crime, Corporate Law, and the 
Perversion of Democracy (Between the Lines, Toronto, 2002). 
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The limited liability issue can also be used in conjunction with and as foundation for more 
specific policy arguments such as those concerning the reform of accountancy and of artificial 
personality. The argument is based on the clear values of classical liberal-democratic 
philosophy and has multiple applications. 
It is vital to accompany an unwavering laser-like focus on the language and values of the 
argument with a parallel and sweeter array of positive reforms. For example: the insurance 
system could be employed to help manage the risk. Apart from shareholders, almost every 
person in the industrialised world ends up needing insurance. Our car insurance protects us if 
we damage someone else or another car; every business needs public-liability insurance. 
Rent a civic centre to throw a party and you will find that, before you can, you will have to buy 
a public-liability insurance policy. This is because if someone is blinded by a party popper you 
could get sued. Even your house insurance is likely to provide cover in case a roof tile lands 
on someone’s head. 
The contrast between what does and does not need to be insured is easy to illustrate. 
Oxford University has a service for its academics looking to spin off limited-liability 
companies. It provides a fairly typical list of the types of insurance that will be needed: ‘The 
spin-out will need to obtain a number of insurance policies including: directors, and officers, 
insurance; building and contents insurance; employer’s liability insurance; public liability 
insurance and product liability insurance.’ No sign of shareholder insurance. 
The creation of insurance for shareholders could be a relatively simple way of re-
establishing equality before the law and placing shareholders as normal citizens with 
responsibility for their actions equivalent to everyone else in society. 
Some people may argue that the insurance industry is already too powerful and has 
introduced too much nannying in society. If the insurance industry is itself behaving badly this 
is perhaps because it too has to provide maximum returns to shareholders, something a 
reform of limited liability would help solve. Insurance is an industry quite well suited to 
nationalisation or to non-profit status. Social insurance for health and old age are two of the 
best-known examples of the nation taking responsibility for insurance provision. Another less 
well-known example is where the nation underwrites mass damage from a terrorist attack, an 
innovation made in the UK after the Provisional IRA attacks on the City of London in the mid-
1990s. 
Restoring equality before the law will help many social, economic and environmental 
campaigns. The removal or reduction of limited liability would ensure that power does not 
come without responsibility. This would do much to redress the imbalance between the 
powerful and the powerless. The accelerating power of the business interest would be likely 
to come to an abrupt halt if it were faced with such a direct challenge to its privilege. Such a 
challenge would affect the organisation of thousands of companies all over the world. The 
mere threat of having their privilege exposed may encourage better behaviour. 
Accountancy Business and the Public Interest, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2005 
 
24
The argument that the regulations protecting shareholders should be removed can be used 
as a direct reply to corporate demands for deregulation of other aspects of the market. 
Opponents of increasing corporate power can argue that the deregulation agenda pursued by 
corporations had better begin with the regulation that prevents citizens from suing 
shareholders. This argument is a much more effective lever than socialist demands for the 
abolition of capitalism or the idea that companies should start behaving like charities. 
The removal or reduction of limited liability is consistent with the universal values that 
power should be matched with responsibility and that we all should be equal before the law. 
Within the US, the restoration of the right to sue is a core American value that can be 
expressed in simple language. In the developing world and in the new European 
democracies, making shareholders liable can be a means of bringing within the law the 
rampant corruption that is aided and abetted by the immunity of limited liability. Campaigning 
to be able to sue shareholders in the same way as anyone else is a clear political demand 
that can reinforce and complement existing efforts to limit the damage caused by 
corporations. In recent years, attempts by the public and pressure groups to tackle corporate 
power have had several public campaigns. These include debt, fair trade, privatisation and 
climate change. Each of these has produced important and imaginative proposals, gained 
considerable public support, but in the end made insufficient progress. 
When corporations destroy the environment, as for example in the case of the tanker 
Exxon Valdez, which was wrecked on the Alaskan coast, releasing vast quantities of oil that 
devastated marine life in the region, massive lawsuits can sometimes be brought against the 
company. All too often, the corporation is found to have been driven by the need to provide 
maximum returns to shareholders. But these shareholders are immune from any normal duty 
of care in carrying out their actions. Were it possible to sue the shareholders, one can be sure 
that they or their insurers would make much stronger demands upon the company to be 
certain that it was not cutting corners to maximise profit. Quite rightly, the environmental 
movement is concerned to introduce stronger legislation requiring corporations to act in an 
environmentally friendly manner. However, if environmentalists include the proposal that 
shareholders should no longer be above the law, then they are likely to find that corporations 
might well begin to make concessions to pre-empt demands on shareholders. In similar 
fashion, corporate demands to remove regulations protecting the environment should be met 
with a counterbalancing proposal to make their stockholders environmentally responsible in 
law. 
Another area where removing special-interest protection can help existing campaigns is in 
the area of deregulation of public services. The demands for compulsory privatisation of 
public services and nationalised industries have been gaining ground continuously around the 
world since their inception in the early days of Margaret Thatcher’s government in the 1980s. 
The debate in Britain has seen service after service put into private hands for the benefit of 
shareholders. Most recently, the issue that has come to the forefront of public attention is the 
use of private medical concerns to supplement the NHS. 
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The issue of shareholder liability, or lack of it, is especially interesting in the case of 
medical issues, not least because most of us are now familiar with the idea of suing 
incompetent doctors, administrators and hospitals. But consider the difference. Let us 
suppose that the same serious problem occurs in both an NHS and a private hospital. In the 
NHS any compensation claim will have to be met by the hospital and, if it runs out of money, 
by the government in London. A private hospital is in a very different situation. If it runs out of 
money its directors can declare it bankrupt and simply walk away from it. In the meantime, the 
shareholders could have sold up, taking their earlier profits with them. Even if their profits 
were made at the time that the medical negligence occurred, no one can touch them. 
These imaginary examples are designed to show how much more powerful a campaign 
can be if it is reinforced with the issue of making shareholders equal before the law.  
Paul Kingsnorth has shown the diversity and also lack of focus of the anti-globalisation 
movement in One No, Many Yeses.27 I hope that reform of limited liability can serve as a 
unifying interest. The power of the argument can become mutually reinforced if it is taken up 
simultaneously on a wide range of issues and in a wide range of countries. The issue of 
making shareholders behave like normal people has the potential to focus the efforts of a lot 
of different campaigns.  
The limited liability issue can unite everyone from those trying to get redress from the 
owners of bankrupt construction company in a suburban town to those fighting the 
privatisation of the water supply. 
Reforming limited liability should improve the overall quality of business activity by 
providing a legal basis on which to build the social responsibility that so many people are 
working for from inside and outside corporations. The proportional liability used in the 
conservative Californian corporation can provide the basis of reform and should be able to 
attract support from across the political spectrum, including those who believe that 
governments should not provide any protection to interest groups.  
                                                     
27 Kingsnorth, P. One No, Many Yeses: a journey to the heart of the global resistance 
movement (Free Press, London, 2003). 
Accountancy Business and the Public Interest, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2005 
 
26
Complete List of References 
 
BBC History Timeline on the Limited Liability Act of 1855. 
Howard Davies, Chairman, Financial Services Authority, ‘Corporate Governance and the Development of Global 
Capital Markets’, China Securities Regulatory Commission, Beijing, 22 April 2002. 
Evans, L. and Quigley, N. ‘Shareholder Liability Regimes, Principal-Agent Relationships, and Banking Industry 
Performance’, Journal of Law and Economics, 1995, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 497–520. 
Financial Times, 21 June 1999. 
FitzGerald, N, Financial Times, 8 September 2003. 
Friedman, M. Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962). 
Glasbeek, H. ‘The Invisible Friend’, New Internationalist, July 2003, no. 358. Prof. Glasbeek is Professor Emeritus 
and Senior Scholar, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, and author of Wealth by Stealth: 
Corporate Crime, Corporate Law, and the Perversion of Democracy (Between the Lines, Toronto, 2002). 
Griffiths, M. ‘Lifting the Corporate Veil’, Kensington Business School, London, 2003. 
Hansmann, H. and Kraakman, R. ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’, Working Paper #CLB-99-013 (New York 
University Center for Law and Business, New York, January 2000). 
Herman, E. and Chomsky, N. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, rev. ed. (Pantheon, 
New York, 2002). 
Hines, C. Localization: A Global Manifesto (Earthscan, London, 2000). 
Hutton, W. The World We’re In (Abacus, London, 2003). 
Kingsnorth, P. One No, Many Yeses: a journey to the heart of the global resistance movement (Free Press, London, 
2003). 
Korten, D. When Corporations Rule the World (Kumarian Press/Berrett-Koehler, West Hartford, CT and San 
Francisco, 1995). 
Michaels, A, Financial Times, 27 August 2003. 
OECD Corporate Governance 1999 (OECD, Paris, 1999). 
Micklethwait, J. and Wooldridge, A. The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
London, 2003). 
Phillips, A, ‘The Charity/Business Duet: Harmony or Discord?’, Allen Lane Lecture, London, 11 February 2003. 
Smith, A. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
[1776] 1976). An excerpt (Book V, ch. 1, pt iii, art. i, pp. 280-82). 
Soros, G. George Soros on Globalization (PublicAffairs, Oxford, 2002). 
 
www.vssp.com 
Recent Court Decision Favorable for Corporate Shareholders on CERCLA Liability: 
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which hears decisions from Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky 
and Tennessee, recently issued a decision on November 17, 1997 which is favorable for corporations and their 
shareholders with respect to when liability can be imposed on shareholders under the federal superfund law, 
CERCLA. The troublesome issue of a shareholder being an owner or operator of a contaminated facility has 
plagued businesses for some time. The Sixth Circuit has cleared up the issue, at least for courts within the Sixth 
Circuit’s jurisdiction. 
In Donahey v. Bogle, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 32146 (6th Cir. 1997), the court, in an en banc 10-2 decision, held 
that a shareholder of a corporation is not liable as an operator as defined under 107(a)(2) of CERCLA unless 
circumstances justify piercing the corporate veil. The court also reaffirmed the principle that the applicable state 
law must be used by federal courts to determine the veil-piercing standards. In this case, the shareholder was the 
sole shareholder of the corporation and was only involved with the financial aspects of the company. The day-to-
day affairs, including the waste disposal activities, were handled by the hired managers who did not need the 
approval of the shareholder to execute their duties. As a general rule, state law corporate veil-piercing standards 
favor corporations. 
Two justices dissented in the decision. The dissenting justices would not apply the veil-piercing standards to a 
sole shareholder who is active in the corporation, but instead would find direct liability under the CERCLA statute 
without first having to pierce the corporate veil. They expressed their concern that a savvy polluter can form a 
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closely held corporation of which he owns 100% of the shares, play an active role in the company, but follow a 
‘don’t ask, don’t tell policy’ regarding disposal of environmental toxins and not be considered an owner or 
operator of the facility. The dissent also stated that it was reserving judgment on whether persons should be held 
liable under CERCLA who own less than 100% of the shares or are not active in management of the facility. 
However, the dissent offers no guidance on where it would draw the line for shareholder personal liability, except 
to state that an appropriate inquiry should be whether the corporate individual could have prevented or stopped 
the hazardous waste discharge. 
The Donahey decision closely follows U.S. v. Cordova, 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997), in which the Sixth Circuit 
recently held that under CERCLA, a parent corporation is liable for the environmental harms done by its 
subsidiary only if the elements necessary to pierce the corporate veil are present. The Cordova decision has 
been appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Court has not yet ruled whether it will accept the case for 
decision. Many of us that have followed these issues expect that the High Court will accept the case because of 
the split in authority around the United States.  
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